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Abstract
Adversarial evaluation stress tests a model’s
understanding of natural language. While
past approaches expose superficial patterns,
the resulting adversarial examples are lim-
ited in complexity and diversity. We pro-
pose human-in-the-loop adversarial gener-
ation, where human authors are guided to
break models. We aid the authors with inter-
pretations of model predictions through an
interactive user interface. We apply this gen-
eration framework to a question answering
task called Quizbowl, where trivia enthusi-
asts craft adversarial questions. The result-
ing questions are validated via live human–
computer matches: although the questions
appear ordinary to humans, they systemati-
cally stump neural and information retrieval
models. The adversarial questions cover di-
verse phenomena from multi-hop reasoning
to entity type distractors, exposing open chal-
lenges in robust question answering.
1 Introduction
Proponents of machine learning claim human par-
ity on tasks like reading comprehension (Yu et al.,
2018) and commonsense inference (Devlin et al.,
2018). Despite these successes, many evaluations
neglect that computers solve natural language pro-
cessing (NLP) tasks in a fundamentally different
way than humans.
Models can succeed without developing “true”
language understanding, instead learning superfi-
cial patterns from crawled (Chen et al., 2016) or
manually annotated datasets (Kaushik and Lipton,
2018; Gururangan et al., 2018). Thus, recent work
stress tests models via adversarial evaluation: elu-
cidating a system’s capabilities by exploiting its
weaknesses (Jia and Liang, 2017; Belinkov and
Glass, 2019). Unfortunately, while adversarial eval-
uation reveals simplistic model failures (Ribeiro
et al., 2018; Mudrakarta et al., 2018), exploring
more complex failure patterns requires human in-
volvement (Figure 1): automatically modifying nat-
ural language examples without invalidating them
is difficult. Hence, the diversity of adversarial ex-
amples is often severely restricted.
Instead, our human–computer hybrid approach
uses human creativity to generate adversarial ex-
amples. A user interface presents model inter-
pretations and helps users craft model-breaking
examples (Section 3). We apply this to a ques-
tion answering (QA) task called Quizbowl, where
trivia enthusiasts—who write questions for aca-
demic competitions—create diverse examples that
stump existing QA models.
The adversarially-authored test set is nonethe-
less as easy as regular questions for humans (Sec-
tion 4), but the relative accuracy of strong QA mod-
els drops as much as 40% (Section 5). We also host
live human vs. computer matches—where mod-
els typically defeat top human teams—but observe
spectacular model failures on adversarial questions.
Analyzing the adversarial edits uncovers phe-
nomena that humans can solve but computers can-
not (Section 6), validating that our framework un-
covers creative, targeted adversarial edits (Sec-
tion 7). Our resulting adversarial dataset presents a
fun, challenging, and diverse resource for future QA
research: a system that masters it will demonstrate
more robust language understanding.
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Figure 1: Adversarial evaluation in NLP typically focuses on a specific phenomenon (e.g., word replace-
ments) and then generates the corresponding examples (top). Consequently, adversarial examples are
limited to the diversity of what the underlying generative model or perturbation rule can produce and also
require downstream human evaluation to ensure validity. Our setup (bottom) instead has human-authored
examples, using human–computer collaboration to craft adversarial examples with greater diversity.
2 Adversarial Evaluation for NLP
Adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013) often
reveal model failures better than traditional test
sets. However, automatic adversarial generation is
tricky for NLP (e.g., by replacing words) without
changing an example’s meaning or invalidating it.
Recent work side-steps this by focusing on sim-
ple transformations that preserve meaning. For
instance, Ribeiro et al. (2018) generate adversarial
perturbations such as replacing What has→What’s.
Other minor perturbations such as typos (Belinkov
and Bisk, 2018), adding distractor sentences (Jia
and Liang, 2017; Mudrakarta et al., 2018), or char-
acter replacements (Ebrahimi et al., 2018) preserve
meaning while degrading model performance.
Generative models can discover more adversarial
perturbations but require post hoc human verifica-
tion of the examples. For example, neural para-
phrase or language models can generate syntax
modifications (Iyyer et al., 2018), plausible cap-
tions (Zellers et al., 2018), or NLI premises (Zhao
et al., 2018). These methods improve example-
level diversity but mainly target a specific phe-
nomenon, e.g., rewriting question syntax.
Furthermore, existing adversarial perturbations
are restricted to sentences—not the paragraph in-
puts of Quizbowl and other tasks—due to chal-
lenges in long-text generation. For instance, syntax
paraphrase networks (Iyyer et al., 2018) applied to
Quizbowl only yield valid paraphrases 3% of the
time (Appendix A).
2.1 Putting a Human in the Loop
Instead, we task human authors with adversarial
writing of questions: generating examples which
break a specific QA system but are still answerable
by humans. We expose model predictions and in-
terpretations to question authors, who find question
edits that confuse the model.
The user interface makes the adversarial writ-
ing process interactive and model-driven, in con-
trast to adversarial examples written independent
of a model (Ettinger et al., 2017). The result is
an adversarially-authored dataset that explicitly ex-
poses a model’s limitations by design.
Human-in-the-loop generation can replace or
aid model-based adversarial generation approaches.
Creating interfaces and interpretations is often eas-
ier than designing and training generative models
for specific domains. In domains where adversarial
generation is feasible, human creativity can reveal
which tactics automatic approaches can later emu-
late. Model-based and human-in-the-loop genera-
tion approaches can also be combined by training
models to mimic human adversarial edit history,
using the relative merits of both approaches.
3 Our QA Testbed: Quizbowl
The “gold standard” of academic competitions be-
tween universities and high schools is Quizbowl.
Unlike QA formats such as Jeopardy! (Ferrucci
et al., 2010), Quizbowl questions are designed to
be interrupted: questions are read to two competing
teams and whoever knows the answer first inter-
rupts the question and “buzzes in”.
This style of play requires questions to be struc-
tured “pyramidally” (Jose, 2017): questions start
with difficult clues and get progressively easier.
These questions are carefully crafted to allow the
most knowledgeable player to answer first. A ques-
tion on Paris that begins “this capital of France”
would test reaction speed, not knowledge; thus,
skilled authors arrange the clues so players will rec-
ognize them with increasing probability (Figure 2).
The answers to Quizbowl questions are typ-
ically well-known entities. In the QA commu-
nity (Hirschman and Gaizauskas, 2001), this is
called “factoid” QA: the entities come from a rela-
tively closed set of possible answers.
The protagonist of this opera describes the future day
when her lover will arrive on a boat in the aria “Un
Bel Di” or “One Beautiful Day”. The only baritone
role in this opera is the consul Sharpless who reads
letters for the protagonist, who has a maid named
Suzuki. That protagonist blindfolds her child Sorrow
before stabbing herself when her lover B. F. Pinkerton
returns with a wife. For 10 points, name this Giacomo
Puccini opera about an American lieutenant’s affair
with the Japanese woman Cio-Cio San.
Answer: Madama Butterfly
Figure 2: An example Quizbowl question. The
question becomes progressively easier (for humans)
to answer later on; thus, more knowledgeable play-
ers can answer after hearing fewer clues. Our ad-
versarial writing process ensures that the clues also
challenge computers.
3.1 Known Exploits of Quizbowl Questions
Like most QA datasets, Quizbowl questions are
written for humans. Unfortunately, the heuristics
that question authors use to select clues do not al-
ways apply to computers. For example, humans
are unlikely to memorize every song in every opera
by a particular composer. This, however, is trivial
for a computer. In particular, a simple QA system
easily solves the example in Figure 2 from seeing
the reference to “Un Bel Di”. Other questions con-
tain uniquely identifying “trigger words” (Harris,
2006). For example, “martensite” only appears in
questions on steel. For these examples, a QA sys-
tem needs to understand no additional information
other than an if–then rule.
One might wonder if this means that factoid
QA is thus an uninteresting, nearly solved research
problem. However, some Quizbowl questions are
fiendishly difficult for computers. Many questions
have intricate coreference patterns (Guha et al.,
2015), require reasoning across multiple types of
knowledge, or involve complex wordplay. If we
can isolate and generate questions with these dif-
ficult phenemona, “simplistic” factoid QA quickly
becomes non-trivial.
3.2 Models and Datasets
We conduct two rounds of adversarial writing. In
the first, authors attack a traditional information
retrieval (IR) system. The IR model is the baseline
from a NIPS 2017 shared task on Quizbowl (Boyd-
Graber et al., 2018) based on ElasticSearch (Gorm-
ley and Tong, 2015).
In the second round, authors attack either the IR
model or a neural QA model. The neural model
is a bidirectional RNN using the gated recurrent
unit architecture (Cho et al., 2014). The model
treats Quizbowl as classification and predicts the
answer entity from a sequence of words represented
as 300-dimensional GloVe embeddings (Penning-
ton et al., 2014). Both models in this round are
trained using an expanded dataset of approximately
110,000 Quizbowl questions. We expand the sec-
ond round dataset to incorporate more diverse an-
swers (25,000 entities versus 11,000 in round one).
3.3 Interpreting Quizbowl Models
To help write adversarial questions, we expose
what the model is thinking to the authors. We inter-
pret models using saliency heat maps: each word of
the question is highlighted based on its importance
to the model’s prediction (Ribeiro et al., 2016).
For the neural model, word importance is the
decrease in prediction probability when a word
is removed (Li et al., 2016; Wallace et al., 2018).
We focus on gradient-based approximations (Si-
monyan et al., 2014; Montavon et al., 2018) for
their computational efficiency.
To interpret a model prediction on an input se-
quence of n words w = 〈w1,w2, . . .wn〉, we ap-
proximate the classifier f with a linear function of
wi derived from the first-order Taylor expansion.
The importance of wi, with embedding vi, is the
derivative of f with respect to the one-hot vector:
∂f
∂wi
=
∂f
∂vi
∂vi
∂wi
=
∂f
∂vi
· vi. (1)
This simulates how model predictions change when
a particular word’s embedding is set to the zero
vector—it approximates word removal (Ebrahimi
et al., 2018; Wallace et al., 2018).
For the IR model, we use the ElasticSearch
Highlight API (Gormley and Tong, 2015), which
provides word importance scores based on query
matches from the inverted index.
3.4 Adversarial Writing Interface
The authors interact with either the IR or RNN
model through a user interface1 (Figure 3). An
author writes their question in the upper right while
the model’s top five predictions (Machine Guesses)
appear in the upper left. If the top prediction is
1https://github.com/Eric-Wallace/
trickme-interface/
Figure 3: The author writes a question (top right), the QA system provides guesses (left), and explains
why it makes those guesses (bottom right). The author can then adapt their question to “trick” the model.
the right answer, the interface indicates where in
the question the model is first correct. The goal
is to cause the model to be incorrect or to delay
the correct answer position as much as possible.2
The words of the current question are highlighted
using the applicable interpretation method in the
lower right (Evidence). We do not enforce time
restrictions or require questions to be adversarial:
if the author fails to break the system, they are free
to “give up” and submit any question.
The interface continually updates as the author
writes. We track the question edit history to identify
recurring model failures (Section 6) and understand
how interpretations guide the authors (Section 7).
3.5 Question Authors
We focus on members of the Quizbowl community:
they have deep trivia knowledge and craft ques-
tions for Quizbowl tournaments (Jennings, 2006).
We award prizes for questions read at live human–
computer matches (Section 5.3).
The question authors are familiar with the stan-
dard format of Quizbowl questions (Lujan and
Teitler, 2003). The questions follow a common
paragraph structure, are well edited for grammar,
2The authors want normal Quizbowl questions which hu-
mans can easily answer by the very end. For popular answers,
(e.g., Australia or Suez Canal), writing novel final give-away
clues is difficult. We thus expect models to often answer
correctly by the very end of the question.
and finish with a simple “give-away” clue. These
constraints benefit the adversarial writing process
as it is very clear what constitutes a difficult but
valid question. Thus, our examples go beyond sur-
face level “breaks” such as character noise (Be-
linkov and Bisk, 2018) or syntax changes (Iyyer
et al., 2018). Rather, questions are difficult because
of their semantic content (examples in Section 6).
3.6 How an Author Writes a Question
To see how an author might write a question with
the interface, we walk through an example of writ-
ing a question’s first sentence. The author first se-
lects the answer to their question from the training
set—Johannes Brahms—and begins:
Karl Ferdinand Pohl showed this com-
poser some pieces on which this com-
poser’s Variations on a Theme by Haydn
were based.
The QA system buzzes (i.e., it has enough informa-
tion to interrupt and answer correctly) after “com-
poser”. The author sees that the name “Karl Fer-
dinand Pohl” appears in Brahms’ Wikipedia page
and avoids that specific phrase, describing Pohl’s
position instead of naming him directly:
This composer was given a theme called
“Chorale St. Antoni” by the archivist
of the Vienna Musikverein, which could
have been written by Ignaz Pleyel.
Science 17%
History 22%
Literature 18%
Fine Arts 15%
Religion, Mythology, 13%Philosophy, and Social Science
Current Events, Geography, 15%and General Knowledge
Total Questions 1213
Table 1: The topical diversity of the questions in the
adversarially-authored dataset based on a random
sample of 100 questions.
This rewrite adds in some additional information
(there is a scholarly disagreement over who wrote
the theme and its name), and the QA system now
incorrectly thinks the answer is Frédéric Chopin.
The user can continue to build on the theme, writing
While summering in Tutzing, this com-
poser turned that theme into “Variations
on a Theme by Haydn”.
Again, the author sees that the system buzzes “Vari-
ations on a Theme” with the correct answer. How-
ever, the author can rewrite it in its original German,
“Variationen über ein Thema von Haydn” to fool
the system. The author continues to create entire
questions the model cannot solve.
4 A New Adversarially-Authored Dataset
Our adversarial dataset consists of 1213 questions
with 6,541 sentences across diverse topics (Ta-
ble 1).3 There are 807 questions written against
the IR system and 406 against the neural model by
115 unique authors. We plan to hold twice-yearly
competitions to continue data collection.
4.1 Validating Questions with Quizbowlers
We validate that the adversarially-authored ques-
tions are not of poor quality or too difficult for
humans. We first automatically filter out questions
based on length, the presence of vulgar statements,
or repeated submissions (including re-submissions
from the Quizbowl training or evaluation data).
We next host a human-only Quizbowl event us-
ing intermediate and expert players (former and
current collegiate Quizbowl players). We select
sixty adversarially-authored questions and sixty
3Data available at http://trickme.qanta.org.
standard high school national championship ques-
tions, both with the same number of questions per
category (list of categories in Table 1).
To answer a Quizbowl question, a player inter-
rupts the question: the earlier the better. To capture
this dynamic, we record both the average answer
position (as a percentage of the question, lower is
better) and answer accuracy. We shuffle the regular
and adversarially-authored questions, read them to
players, and record these two metrics.
The adversarially-authored questions are on av-
erage easier for humans than the regular test ques-
tions. For the adversarially-authored set, humans
buzz with 41.6% of the question remaining and
an accuracy of 89.7%. On the standard questions,
humans buzz with 28.3% of the question remain-
ing and an accuracy of 84.2%. The difference in
accuracy between the two types of questions is
not significantly different (p = 0.16 using Fisher’s
exact test), but the buzzing position is earlier for
adversarially-authored questions (p = 0.0047 for a
two-sided t-test). We expect the questions that were
not played to be of comparable difficulty because
they went through the same submission process and
post-processing. We further explore the human-
perceived difficulty of the adversarially-authored
questions in Section 5.3.
5 Computer Experiments
This section evaluates QA systems on the
adversarially-authored questions. We test three
models: the IR and RNN models shown in the inter-
face, as well as a Deep Averaging Network (Iyyer
et al., 2015, DAN) to evaluate the transferabil-
ity of the adversarial questions. We break our
study into two rounds. The first round consists
of adversarially-authored questions written against
the IR system (Section 5.1); the second round ques-
tions target both the IR and RNN (Section 5.2).
Finally, we also hold live competitions that pit
the state-of-the-art Studio Ousia model (Yamada
et al., 2018) against human teams (Section 5.3).
5.1 First Round Attacks: IR Adversarial
Questions Transfer To All Models
The first round of adversarially-authored questions
target the IR model and are significantly harder for
the IR, RNN, and DAN models (Figure 4). For exam-
ple, the DAN’s accuracy drops from 54.1% to 32.4%
on the full question (60% of original performance).
For both adversarially-authored and original test
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Figure 4: The first round of adversarial writing attacks the IR model. Like regular test questions,
adversarially-authored questions begin with difficult clues that trick the model. However, the adversarial
questions are significantly harder during the crucial middle third of the question.
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Figure 5: The second round of adversarial writing attacks the IR and RNN models. The questions targeted
against the IR system degrade the performance of all models. However, the reverse does not hold: the IR
model is robust to the questions written to fool the RNN.
questions, early clues are difficult to answer (accu-
racy about 10% for the first quarter of the question).
However, during the middle third of the questions,
where buzzes in Quizbowl most frequently occur,
accuracy on original test questions rises quicker
than the adversarially-authored ones. For both, the
accuracy rises towards the end as the clues become
“give-aways”.
5.2 Second Round Attacks: RNN
Adversarial Questions are Brittle
In the second round, the authors also attack an RNN
model. All models tested in the second round are
trained on a larger dataset (Section 3.2).
A similar trend holds for IR adversarial ques-
tions in the second round (Figure 5): a question
that tricks the IR system also fools the two neural
models (i.e., adversarial examples transfer). For
example, the DAN model was never targeted but
had substantial accuracy decreases in both rounds.
However, this does not hold for questions written
adversarially against the RNN model. On these
questions, the neural models struggle but the IR
model is largely unaffected (Figure 5, right).
5.3 Humans vs. Computer, Live!
In the offline setting (i.e., no pressure to “buzz”
before an opponent) models demonstrably struggle
on the adversarial questions. But, what happens in
standard Quizbowl: live, head-to-head games?
We run two live humans vs. computer matches.
The first match uses IR adversarial questions in a
forty question, tossup-only Quizbowl format. We
pit a human team of national-level Quizbowl play-
ers against the Studio Ousia model (Yamada et al.,
2018), the current state-of-the-art Quizbowl system.
The model combines neural, IR, and knowledge
graph components (details in Appendix B), and
won the 2017 NIPS shared task, defeating a team of
expert humans 475–200 on regular Quizbowl test
questions. Although the team at our live event was
comparable to the NIPS 2017 team, the tables were
turned: the human team won handedly 300–30.
Our second live event is significantly larger:
seven human teams play against models on over
400 questions written adversarially against the RNN
model. The human teams range in ability from high
school Quizbowl players to national-level teams
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Figure 6: Humans find adversarially-authored question about as difficult as normal questions: rusty
weekend warriors (Intermediate), active players (Expert), or the best trivia players in the world (National).
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Figure 7: The accuracy of the state-of-the-art Stu-
dio Ousia model degrades on the adversarially-
authored questions despite never being directly tar-
geted. This verifies that our findings generalize
beyond the RNN and IR models.
(Jeopardy! champions, Academic Competition
Federation national champions, top scorers in the
World Quizzing Championships). The models are
based on either IR or neural methods. Despite a few
close games between the weaker human teams and
the models, humanity prevailed in every match.4
Figures 6–7 summarize the live match results
for the humans and Ousia model, respectively.
Humans and models have considerably different
trends in answer accuracy. Human accuracy on
both regular and adversarial questions rises quickly
in the last half of the question (curves in Figure 6).
In essence, the “give-away” clues at the end of
questions are easy for humans to answer.
On the other hand, models on regular test ques-
tions do well in the first half, i.e., the “difficult”
clues for humans are easier for models (Regular
Test in Figure 7). However, models, like humans,
struggle on adversarial questions in the first half.
4Videos available at http://trickme.qanta.org.
6 What Makes Adversarially-authored
Questions Hard?
This section analyzes the adversarially-authored
questions to identify the source of their difficulty.
6.1 Quantitative Differences in Questions
One possible source of difficulty is data scarcity:
the answers to adversarial questions rarely appear
in the training set. However, this is not the case;
the mean number of training examples per answer
(e.g., George Washington) is 14.9 for the adversar-
ial questions versus 16.9 for the regular test data.
Another explanation for question difficulty is
limited “overlap” with the training data, i.e., mod-
els cannot match n-grams from the training clues.
We measure the proportion of test n-grams that
also appear in training questions with the same an-
swer (Table 2). The overlap is roughly equal for
unigrams but surprisingly higher for adversarial
questions’ bigrams. The adversarial questions are
also shorter and have fewer NEs. However, the
proportion of named entities is roughly equivalent.
One difference between the questions written
against the IR system and the ones written against
the RNN model is the drop in NEs. The decrease in
NEs is higher for IR adversarial questions, which
may explain their generalization: the RNN is more
sensitive to changes in phrasing, while the IR sys-
tem is more sensitive to specific words.
6.2 Categorizing Adversarial Phenomena
We next qualitatively analyze adversarially-
authored questions. We manually inspect the au-
thor edit logs, classifying questions into six differ-
ent phenomena in two broad categories (Table 3)
from a random sample of 100 questions, double
counting questions into multiple phenomena when
applicable.
Adversarial Regular
Unigram overlap 0.40 0.37
Bigram overlap 0.08 0.05
Longest n-gram overlap 6.73 6.87
Average NE overlap 0.38 0.46
IR Adversarial 0.35
RNN Adversarial 0.44
Total Words 107.1 133.5
Total NE 9.1 12.5
Table 2: The adversarially-authored questions have
similar n-gram overlap to the regular test questions.
However, the overlap of the named entities (NE)
decreases for IR Adversarial questions.
Composing Seen Clues 15%
Logic & Calculations 5%
Multi-Step Reasoning 25%
Paraphrases 38%
Entity Type Distractors 7%
Novel Clues 26%
Total Questions 1213
Table 3: A breakdown of the phenomena in the
adversarially-authored dataset.
6.2.1 Adversarial Category 1: Reasoning
The first question category requires reasoning about
known clues (Table 4).
Composing Seen Clues: These questions pro-
vide entities with a first-order relationship to the
correct answer. The system must triangulate the
correct answer by “filling in the blank”. For ex-
ample, the first question of Table 4 names the
place of death of Tecumseh. The training data con-
tains a question about his death reading “though
stiff fighting came from their Native American
allies under Tecumseh, who died at this battle”
(The Battle of the Thames). The system must con-
nect these two clues to answer.
Logic & Calculations: These questions require
mathematical or logical operators. For exam-
ple, the training data contains a clue about the
Battle of Thermopylae: “King Leonidas and 300
Spartans died at the hands of the Persians”. The
second question in Table 4 requires adding 150 to
the number of Spartans.
Multi-Step Reasoning: This question type re-
quires multiple reasoning steps between entities.
For example, the last question of Table 4 requires a
reasoning step from the “I Have A Dream” speech
to the Lincoln Memorial and then another reason-
ing step to reach Abraham Lincoln.
6.2.2 Adversarial Category 2: Distracting
Clues
The second category consists of circumlocutory
clues (Table 5).
Paraphrases: A common adversarial modifica-
tion is to paraphrase clues to remove exact n-gram
matches from the training data. This renders our
IR system useless but also hurts the neural mod-
els. Many of the adversarial paraphrases go beyond
syntax-only changes (e.g., the first row of Table 5).
Entity Type Distractors: Whether explicit or
implicit in a model, one key component for QA
is determining the answer type of the question. Au-
thors take advantage of this by providing clues that
cause the model to select the wrong answer type.
For example, in the second question of Table 5, the
“lead-in” clue implies the answer may be an actor.
The RNN model answers Don Cheadle in response
despite previously seeing the Bill Clinton “playing
a saxophone” clue in the training data.
Novel Clues: Some adversarially-authored ques-
tions are hard not because of phrasing or logic
but because our models have not seen these clues.
These questions are easy to create: users can add
Novel Clues that—because they are not uniquely
associated with an answer—confuse the models.
While not as linguistically interesting, novel clues
are not captured by Wikipedia or Quizbowl data,
thus improving the dataset’s diversity. For example,
adding clues about literary criticism (Hardwick,
1967; Watson, 1996) to a question about Lillian
Hellman’s The Little Foxes: “Ritchie Watson com-
mended this play’s historical accuracy for getting
the price for a dozen eggs right—ten cents—to de-
fend against Elizabeth Hardwick’s contention that
it was a sentimental history.” Novel clues create
an incentive for models to use information beyond
past questions and Wikipedia.
Novel clues have different effects on IR and neu-
ral models: while IR models largely ignore them,
novel clues can lead neural models astray. For ex-
ample, on a question about Tiananmen Square, the
RNN model buzzes on the clue “World Economic
Question Prediction Answer Phenomenon
This man, who died at the Battle of the
Thames, experienced a setback when his
brother Tenskwatawa’s influence over their
tribe began to fade.
Battle of Tippecanoe Tecumseh Composing
Seen Clues
This number is one hundred fifty more than
the number of Spartans at Thermopylae.
Battle of Thermopylae 450 Logic & Cal-
culations
A building dedicated to this man was the
site of the “I Have A Dream” speech.
Martin Luther King Jr. Abraham Lincoln Multi-Step
Reasoning
Table 4: The first category of adversarially-authored questions consists of examples that require reasoning.
Answer displays the correct answer (all models were incorrect). For these examples, connecting the
training and adversarially-authored clues is simple for humans but difficult for models.
Set Question Prediction Phenomenon
Training Name this sociological phenomenon, the taking of one’s
own life.
Suicide
Paraphrase
Adversarial Name this self-inflicted method of death. Arthur Miller
Training Clinton played the saxophone on The Arsenio Hall Show. Bill Clinton
Adversarial He was edited to appear in the film “Contact”. . . For ten
points, name this American president who played the
saxophone on an appearance on the Arsenio Hall Show.
Don Cheadle Entity Type
Distractor
Table 5: The second category of adversarial questions consists of clues that are present in the training data
but are written in a distracting manner. Training shows relevant snippets from the training data. Prediction
displays the RNN model’s answer prediction (always correct on Training, always incorrect on Adversarial).
Herald”. However, adding a novel clue about “the
history of shaving” renders the brittle RNN unable
to buzz on the “World Economic Herald” clue that
it was able to recognize before.5 This helps to ex-
plain why adversarially-authored questions written
against the RNN do not stump IR models.
7 How Do Interpretations Help?
This section explores how model interpretations
help to guide adversarial authors. We analyze the
question edit log, which reflects how authors mod-
ify questions given a model interpretation.
A direct edit of the highlighted words often cre-
ates an adversarial example (e.g., Figure 8). Fig-
ure 9 shows a more intricate example. The left plot
shows the Question Length, as well as the position
where the model is first correct (Buzzing Position,
lower is better). We show two adversarial edits. In
the first (1), the author removes the first sentence of
the question, which makes the question easier for
5The “history of shaving” is a tongue-in-cheek name for a
poster displaying the hirsute leaders of Communist thought. It
goes from the bearded Marx and Engels, to the mustachioed
Lenin and Stalin, and finally the clean-shaven Mao.
One of these concepts . . . a Hyperbola is a type
of, for ten points, what shapes made by passing
a plane through a namesake solid,
that also includes the ellipse, parabola?
whose area is given by one-third Pi r squared
times height?
Prediction: Conic Section (3)→ Sphere (7)
Figure 8: The interpretation successfully aids
an attack against the IR system. The author re-
moves the phrase containing the words “ellipse”
and “parabola”, which are highlighted in the in-
terface (shown in bold). In its place, they add a
phrase which the model associates with the answer
Sphere.
the model (buzz position decreases). The author
counteracts this in the second edit (2), where they
use the interpretation to craft a targeted modifica-
tion which breaks the IR model.
However, models are not always this brittle. In
Figure 10 (Appendix C), the interpretation fails to
aid an adversarial attack against the RNN model. At
each step, the author uses the highlighted words as
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In his speeches this . . . As a Senator,
  this man supported Paraguay in the
Chaco War, believing Bolivia was backed
by Standard Oil.
+ this man’s campaign was endorsed by
Milo Reno and Charles Coughlin.
Prediction: Huey Long (3)! Huey Long (3)
In his speeches this . . . As a Senator, this man’s
campaign was endorsed byMilo Reno and
  Charles Coughlin.
+ a Catholic priest and radio show host.
Prediction: Huey Long (3)! Huey Long (3)
Figure 6: An failed attempt to trick the neural
model. The user modified the question multiple
times, replacing words suggested by the interpreta-
tion, but was unable to break the system.
The BioLIp database stores data on the
interaction of these species with proteins.
Examples of these molecules with C2 symme-
try can increase enantioselectivity, as in their
Josiphos variety. . .
Prediction: Ion (7)! Ligand (3)
Examples of these molecules species with C2
symmetry can increase enantioselectivity, as in
their Josiphos variety. . .
Prediction: Ligand (3)! Ion (7)
Figure 7: An failed attempt to trick the neural
model. The user modified the question multiple
times, replacing words suggested by the interpreta-
tion, but was unable to break the system.
and predictions to aid in the generation of chal-
lenging examples. This new annotation method is
salient given the difficulty of collecting large-scale
datasets that do not contain superficial clues mod-
els can use to “game” a task (Gururangan et al.,
2018; Chen et al., 2016). Our adversarial writing
framework alleviates these annotation artifacts by
exposing model pathologies (and their learned arti-
facts) during the data annotation process.
While our adversarial writing setup requires
clear interpretations of a model, annotators can
still generate challenging examples for neural sys-
tems even using IR output. The effort required from
annotators increases during the adversarial writing
process, as they may need to rewrite an example
numerous times. However, better model interpre-
tation techniques and visualizations can ease this
burden.
Another benefit of leveraging human adversaries
is that they can generate examples that are more di-
verse than automatic methods (Jia and Liang, 2017;
Iyyer et al., 2018). This diversity provides insight
into numerous model limitations, rather than a sin-
gle one. Combining these two approaches, perhaps
by training models to mimic user edit history, could
be fruitful to explore in future work.
9 Related Work
Creating evaluation datasets to get a fine-grained
analysis of particular linguistics features or model
attributes has been explored in past work. The
LAMBADA dataset tests a model’s ability to under-
stand the broad contexts present in book passages
(Paperno et al., 2016). Other work focuses on natu-
ral language inference, where challenge examples
highlight existing model failures (Wang et al., 2018;
Glockner et al., 2018; Naik et al., 2018). Our work
is unique in that we use human as adversaries to ex-
pose model weaknesses, which provides a diverse
set of phenomena (from paraphrases to multi-hop
reasoning) that models can’t solve.
Other work has explored specific limitations
of NLP systems. Rimell et al. (2009) show that
parsers struggle on test examples with unbounded
dependencies. A closely related work to ours is
Ettinger et al. (2017) who also use humans as ad-
versaries. Unlike their Build-it Break-it setting, we
have a ready-made audience of “breakers” who are
motivated and capable of generating adversarial ex-
amples. Our work also differs in that we use model
interpretation methods to facilitate the breaking in
an collaborative manner.
Finally, we discussed recent work on adversarial
NLP attacks in Section ??. These types of input
modifications target one specific type of phenom-
ena (e.g., syntatic modifications). These methods
are a complementary strategy to adversarial evalua-
tion of NLP models.
10 Conclusion
It is difficult to automatically expose the limitations
of a machine learning system, especially when that
system solves a fixed held-out evaluation set. In
our setup, humans try to break a trained system. By
supporting this breaking process with interpretation
methods, users can understand what a model is
1 2
1
2
Figure 9: The Question Length and the position where the model is first correct (Buzzing Position, lower
is better) are shown as a question is written. In (1), the author makes a mistake by removing a sentence
that makes the question easier for the IR model. In (2), the author uses the interpretation, replacing the
highlighted word (shown in bold) “molecules” with “species” to trick the RNN model.
a guide to edit targeted portions of the question yet
fails to trick the model. The author gives up and
submits their relatively non-adversarial question.
7.1 Interviews With Adversarial Authors
We also interview the adversarial authors who at-
tended our live events. Multiple authors agree that
identifying oft-repeated “stock” clues was the inter-
face’s most useful feature. As one author explained,
“There were clues which I did not think were stock
clues but were later revealed to be”. In particular,
the author’s question about the Congress of Vienna
used a clue about “Kraków becoming a free city”,
which the model immediately recognized.
Another interviewee was Jordan Brownstein,6 a
national Quizbowl champion and one of the best ac-
tive players, who felt that computer opponents were
better at questions that contained direct references
to battles or poetry. He also explained how the dif-
ferent writing styles used by each Quizbowl author
increases the difficulty of questions for computers.
The interface’s evidence panel allows authors to
read existing clues which encourages these unique
stylistic choices.
8 Related Work
New datasets often allow for a finer-grained anal-
ysis of a linguistic phenomenon, task, or genre.
The LAMBADA dataset (Paperno et al., 2016) tests
a model’s understanding of the broad contexts
6https://www.qbwiki.com/wiki/Jordan_
Brownstein
present in book passages, while the Natural Ques-
tions corpus (Kwiatkowski et al., 2019) combs
Wikipedia for answers to questions that users trust
search engines to answer (Oeldorf-Hirsch et al.,
2014). Other work focuses on natural language in-
ference, where challenge examples highlight model
failures (Wang et al., 2019; Glockner et al., 2018;
Naik et al., 2018). Our work is unique in that
we use human adversaries to expose model weak-
nesses, which provides a diverse set of phenom-
ena (from paraphrases to multi-hop reasoning) that
models cannot solve.
Other work puts n adversary in the data annota-
tion or postprocessing loop. For instance, Dua et al.
(2019) and Zhang et al. (2018) filter out easy ques-
tions using a baseline QA model, while Zellers et al.
(2018) use stylistic classifiers to filter language in-
ference examples. Rather than filtering out easy
questions, we instead use human adversaries to gen-
erate hard ones. Similar to our work, Ettinger et al.
(2017) use human adversaries. We extend their
setting by providing humans with model interpre-
tations to facilitate adversarial writing. Moreover,
we have a ready-made audience of question writers
to generate adversarial questions.
The collaborative adversarial writing process re-
flects the complementary abilities of humans and
computers. For instance, “centaur” chess teams of
both a human and a computer are often stronger
than a human or computer alone (Case, 2018). In
Starcraft, humans devise high-level “macro” strate-
gies, while computers are superior at executing fast
and precise “micro” actions (Vinyals et al., 2017).
In NLP, computers aid simultaneous human inter-
preters (He et al., 2016) at remembering forgotten
information or translating unfamiliar words.
Finally, recent approaches to adversarial eval-
uation of NLP models (Section 2) typically target
one phenomenon (e.g., syntactic modifications) and
complement our human-in-the-loop approach.
9 Conclusion
One of the challenges of machine learning is know-
ing why systems fail. This work brings together
two threads that attempt to answer this question:
visualizations and adversarial examples. Visualiza-
tions underscore the capabilities of existing models,
while adversarial examples—crafted with the inge-
nuity of human experts—show that these models
are still far from matching human prowess.
Our experiments with both neural and IR method-
ologies show that QA models still struggle with syn-
thesizing clues, handling distracting information,
and adapting to unfamiliar data. Our adversarially-
authored dataset is only the first of many itera-
tions (Ruef et al., 2016). As models improve, fu-
ture adversarially-authored datasets can elucidate
the limitations of next-generation QA systems.
While we focus on QA, our procedure is appli-
cable to other NLP settings where there is (1) a
pool of talented authors who (2) write text with
specific goals. Future research can look to craft
adversarially-authored datasets for other NLP tasks
that meet these criteria.
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Sentence Success/Failure Phenomena
its types include “frictional”, “cyclical”, and “structural”
Missing Information 7
its types include “frictional”, and structural
german author of the sorrows of young werther and a two-part faust
Lost Named Entity 7
german author of the sorrows of mr. werther
name this elegy on the death of john keats composed by percy shelley
Incorrect Clue 7
name was this elegy on the death of percy shelley
identify this play about willy loman written by arthur miller
Unsuited Syntax Template 7
so you can identify this work of mr. miller
he employed marco polo and his father as ambassadors
Verb Synonym X
he hired marco polo and his father as ambassadors
Table 6: Failure and success cases for SCPN. The model fails to create a valid paraphrase of the sentence
for 97% of questions.
A Failure of Syntactically Controlled
Paraphrase Networks
We apply the Syntactically Controlled Paraphrase
Network (Iyyer et al., 2018, SCPN) to Quizbowl
questions. The model operates on the sentence
level and cannot paraphrase paragraphs. We thus
feed in each sentence independently, ignoring pos-
sible breaks in coreference. The model does not
correctly paraphrase most of the complex sentences
present in Quizbowl questions. The paraphrases
were rife with issues: ungrammatical, repetitive, or
missing information.
To simplify the setting, we focus on paraphrasing
the shortest sentence from each question (often the
final clue). The model still fails in this case. We
analyze a random sample of 200 paraphrases: only
six maintained all of the original information.
Table 6 shows common failure cases. One re-
curring issue is an inability to maintain the correct
named entities after paraphrasing. In Quizbowl,
maintaining entity information is vital for ensuring
question validity. We were surprised by this failure
because SCPN incorporates a copy mechanism.
B Studio Ousia Quizbowl Model
The Studio Ousia system works by aggregating
scores from both a neural text classification model
and an IR system. Additionally, it scores answers
based on their match with the correct entity type
(e.g., religious leader, government agency, etc.) pre-
dicted by a neural entity type classifier. The Studio
Ousia system also uses data beyond Quizbowl ques-
tions and the text of Wikipedia pages, integrating
entities from a knowledge graph and customized
word vectors (Yamada et al., 2018).
C Failed Adversarial Attempt
Figure 10 shows a user’s failed attempt to break the
neural Quizbowl model.
In his speeches this . . . As a Senator,
this man supported Paraguay in the
Chaco War, believing Bolivia was backed
by Standard Oil.
this man’s campaign was endorsed by
Milo Reno and Charles Coughlin.
Prediction: Huey Long (3)→ Huey Long (3)
In his speeches this . . . As a Senator, this man’s
campaign was endorsed by Milo Reno and
Charles Coughlin.
a Catholic priest and radio show host.
Prediction: Huey Long (3)→ Huey Long (3)
Figure 10: A failed attempt to trick the neural
model. The author modifies the question multiple
times, replacing words suggested by the interpreta-
tion, but is unable to break the system.
